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Abstract
Fundamental discrepancy between first order logic and statistical inference
(global versus local properties of universe) is shown to be the obstacle for
integration of logic and probability in L.p. logic of Bacchus. To overcome the
counterintuitiveness of L.p. behaviour, a 3-valued logic is proposed.
1 Introduction
The paper of Bacchus1 aims at painless integration of two paradigms of human
reasoning, that is 1) first order logics and 2) statistical inference. (see also8 ) in such
a way as to avoid all the contradictions emerging in previous approaches.
Nonetheless the claim of the current paper is that also the L.p. logic of Bacchus1
fails to achieve its primary goal of becoming the tool for describing knowledge &
reasoning in expert systems and other knowledge-based systems. In Section 2 we
present several simple examples of basic flaws of this logic exploiting the counter
intuitiveness of the L.p. logic. Section 3 demonstrates a more elaborated example
pointing at weaknesses of the L.p. logic.
As a remedy we propose (in a sketchy way) a different deduction theory taking
into account the gap between first-order way of thinking (global treatment of do-
mains) and that of statistical (experimental) sciences (local treatment of domains).
2 Flaws of Theories Criticized by Bacchus and
His Solution
A number of works were concerned with representational and inferential issues when
probabilities of events were identified as degrees of belief. Bacchus criticized i.e. the
following approaches:
Approach 1: (propositional logic) : (see.6,7 ) Probability of a sentence is the
probability of selection of one of those possible worlds wherein this sentence holds.
E.g. the 90 % belief that the famous Tweety flies is stated as Prob(F lies(Tweety)) =
x with x being greater than 0.9. However, such an approach does not make it easy
to state that “Most birds fly”.
Approach 2: (first order logic) The probability of the expression: ∀x.Bird(x) →
F lies(x) be expressed as Prob(∀x.Bird(x)→ F lies(x)). Following the principles of
probability calculus we obtain: Prob(∃ x.Bird(x)∧¬F lies(x)) = Prob(¬(∀x.Bird(x)→
F lies(x))) = 1 − Prob(∀x.Bird(x) → F lies(x))). Hence if Prob(∀x.Bird(x) →
F lies(x)) > 0.9, then it should hold that Prob(∃ x.Bird(x)∧¬F lies(x)) < 0.1. How-
ever one can imagine such a set of possible worlds that in most of those worlds most
of birds fly and at the same time in most of the worlds non-flying birds, exist, that
is both Prob(∀x.Bird(x)→ F lies(x)) > 0.9 and Prob(∃ x.Bird(x) ∧ ¬F lies(x)) >
0.9 > 0.1 hold which means a contradiction.
Approach 3: Cheeseman5 proposed that the above statements be meta-expression
with conditional probability of the type:
∀x.Prob[F lies(x) | Bird(x)] > 0.9
However, this representation cannot be treated as a method of expression of statis-
tical knowledge but rather as an update method for degrees of belief, as it leads to
a contradiction when mixing general and particular knowledge (see1 for details).
So, both probability inside and outside the scope of quantifiers lead to contradic-
tions. Hence Bacchus proposed an L.p. logic described in1 , where the probability
is a quantifier itself (probability of the formula α(x) with the free variable x is
expressed as [α(x)]x . Let us cite here from
1 :
INFERENCE RULE: (modus ponens)
R1: From {α , α→ β} infer β.
DEFINITION: Conditional probability [β | α]x ( β conditioned on α):
([α]x > 0→ [β ∧ α]x = [β | α]x ∗ [α]x) ∧ ([α]x = 0→ [β | α]x = 0)
3 The Flaws of Bacchus Himself
Let us show now the major weaknesses of the L.p. logic. Let us notice the following:
1. many Logic-based knowledge systems express general knowledge in terms of
implications,
2. all the examples of statistical knowledge representation in 1 refer to conditional
probabilities instead of probabilities of implications.
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3. the concept of conditional probability in L.p. is not a primary one but a
concept derived from “absolute” probability in a strange way (see below),
4. the strangeness of conditional probability definition results from missing logical
construct corresponding to conditional probability, (a construct of the form:
p⇒ q with [p⇒ q]x == [q | p]x).
5. the conditional probability does not suffice to substitute this missing logical
construct, for how to express a statement “in most cases whenever p implies
q then also v implies z”.
Let us demonstrate the non-suitability of implication for expressing statistical
knowledge.
Example 1: What is the sum of conditional probabilities of an event and its
counter-event [α | β]x + [¬α | β]x ? The answer is: either 1 or 0!! (depend-
ing on the probability of β, that is [β]x).
Example 2: What is the conditional probability of an event conditioned on itself:
[α | α]x ? The answer is: either 1 or 0!!! (depending on the probability of α, that is
[α]x ).
Example 3: Let us consider the following facts:
“With a certainty of at most 90 % if you are man then you are fertile.”
“With a certainty of at most 80 % if you are a fertile man then you will become a
father”
“If you are a father then you are a man.”
What is the probability of being a woman ?
The answer is: at most 0.7. The proof is as follows:
We obtain the translation of the facts:
[man(x)→ fertile(x)]x ≤ 0.9,
[man(x) ∧ fertile(x)→ father(x)]x < 0.8,
∀ x.(father(x)→ man(x))
Hence:
[¬(man(x)→ fertile(x))]x ≥ 0.1
[¬(man(x) ∧ fertile(x)→ father(x))]x ≥ 0.2
Hence:
[man(x) ∧ ¬fertile(x))]x ≥ 0.1
[man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ ¬father(x))]x > 0.2
But:
[woman(x)]x = 1− [man(x)]x =
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= 1− [(man(x) ∧ ¬fertile(x)) ∨ (man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ father(x))
∨(man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ ¬father(x))]x =
= 1− [man(x) ∧ ¬fertile(x)]x − [man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ father(x)]x
−[man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ ¬father(x)]x ≤
≤ 1− [man(x) ∧ ¬fertile(x)]x − [man(x) ∧ fertile(x) ∧ father(x)]x ≤
≤ 1− 0.1− 0.2 = 0.7 Q.e.d.
Example 4. Let us consider the following facts:
“For all x, if x is a male then x is not pregnant” and
“For all x, it is not true that if x is a male then x is pregnant”
The question is: are there any females ?
Let us use the following predicates: m(x)–male x, p(x) –pregnant x
We obtain the translation:
∀x. (m(x)→ ¬p(x)) and ∀x. ¬(m(x)→ p(x))
Hence:
[(m(x)→ ¬p(x))]x = 1 and [¬(m(x)→ p(x))]x = 1
hence:
[(m(x)→ ¬p(x))]x = 1 and [(m(x)→ p(x))] = 0
But:
∀x. ((m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∨ (m(x)→ p(x))
Hence
[(m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∨ (m(x)→ p(x)]x = 1
but
[(m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∨ (m(x)→ p(x)] =
= [m(x)→ ¬p(x)]x + [m(x)→ p(x)]x − [(m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∧ (m(x)→ p(x)]x
Hence:
1 = 1 + 0− [(m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∧ (m(x)→ p(x)]x
Hence:
[(m(x)→ ¬p(x)) ∧ (m(x)→ p(x)]x = 0
[¬m(x)]x = 0
So being a female is improbable !!!!
Before proceeding with another example let us remind a basic fact from intuitive
reasoning: whenever we consider a piece of knowledge to be nearly sure, we reason
with it as if it were absolutely true and when we obtain a result then we believe it
to be nearly sure if the reasoning chain is not too long. We also take our experience
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learned in one environment and expect it to hold in a different environment if the
first environment yielded significant results. When we apply a body of general
knowledge to an individual case, we usually possess only partial knowledge of the
case and reason as if we have had a population of cases fitting our knowledge of the
individuum and obtain statistical results covering this artificial population. This is
how Bayesian networks4 are used for individual diagnosis, as done in1 Example 8
also. This is also the very nature of Miller’s Principle3 .
Let us state some claims about L.p. logic5 :
Theorem 1 L.p. logic is equivalent to a logic Lp’ derived from L.p. by substitution
of the inference rule R with R1’ and R2’:
R1’: From {[α]x = 1, [α → β]x = 1} infer [β]x = 1., with vector x being vector of
all free variables in α and β.
R2’: From {α→ β} infer [α→ β]x = 1, (x as in R1’).
PROOF: see5 ✷
Theorem 2 Lp’ logic is equivalent to a logic Lp” derived from Lp’ by substitution
of the inference rules Ri’ with R1”, R2”, R3”:
R1”: From {[α]x = 1, [β | α]x = 1} infer [β]x = 1., with vector x is vector of
all free variables in α and β.
R2” = R2’
R3”: From {[α→ β]x = 1.[α]x > 0 infer [β | α]x = 1, (x as above).
PROOF: see5 ✷
Theorem 3 Given [α]x > 0, always [β | α]x ≤ [α→ β]x.
PROOF: easily seen ✷
Theorem 4 If within the proof system Lp’ in a certain step of the proof the premise/conclusion
is weakened [α]x = 1 − ε2, [α → β]x = 1 − ε1 (εi ≥ 0 and small), then in the
equivalent proof in Lp” we get: [β | α]x ≥ 1− 2ε1
PROOF:
1 = ε1+ [α→ β]x = ε1 + [¬α∨ β]x ≤ ε1 + [¬α]x + [β]x = ε1 + ε2 + [β]x ,
hence:
[β]x ≥ 1− ε1 − ε2
[β | α]x = [β ∧ α]x/[α]x = ([β]x − [¬β ∧ α]x)/[α]x = ([β]x − [¬(β ∨¬α]x)/[α]x =
= ([β]x − [¬(α→ β)]x)/[α]x = ([β]x − (1 − [(α→ β)]x))/[α]x
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≥ (1− ε1 − ε2 − 1 + 1− ε1)/(1− ε2) = (1− ε2)/(1− ε2)− 2ε1/(1− ε2) = 1− 2ε1/(1− ε2) ≥
1 − 2ε1 Q.e.d. ✷
Example 5: Let us consider the example 8 from1,page 227. (Fig. 1: from1 with
my interpretation for X1 − X4 ): Let us first consider the rules:
X1 (guilty)
X3 prison
X4 punishment
financial X2punishment
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅❘
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ✠
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅
❅❘
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Fig1: Example 8 from [page 227] [1] – intrepreted
¬X1(x)→ X3(x) and X3(x) ∨X2(x)→ X4(x).
Hence if ¬X1(x) is valid, then in the logic Lp’ we obtain rules:
[¬X1(x)→ X3(x)] = 1 and [X3(x) ∨X2(x)→ X4(x)]x = 1
then
From ¬X1(x), [¬X1(x)→ X3(x)]x = 1 infer[X3(x)]x = 1
From [X3(x)] = 1, definition ∨
′ infer [X3(x) ∨X2(x)]x = 1
From [X3(x) ∨X2(x)] = 1, [X3(x) ∨X2(x)→ X4(x)]x = 1 infer
[X4(x)]x = 1.
Now let us imagine we verify our rules in a real world environment. Let among 100
persons appearing before court be 5 innocent ones none of which was condemned,
and 95 guilty persons of which 94 were imprisoned and one had to pay a fine. Then:
[¬X1(x)→ X(x)]x = 0.95 and [X3(x) ∨X2(x)→ X4(x)]x = 1
So in fact our rules are highly probable. Now let us apply the rules learned previously
to an individuum of which we know it is innocent. So we consider a population with
[¬X1(x)]x = 1. Following the spirit of the previous deduction we obtain:
From ¬X1(x), [¬X1(x)→ X3(x)]x = 0.95 infer [X3(x)]x > 0.95
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From [X3(x)]x > 0.95, definition of
′ ∨′ infer
[X3(x) ∨X2(x)]x > 0.95
From [X3(x) ∨X2(x)]x > 0.95, [X3(x) ∨X2(x)→ X4(x)]x = 1 infer
[X4(x)]x > 0.95.
However, if we considered conditional probabilities instead of probabilities of in-
ference rules we would obtain: [X4(x)]x = 0 (innocent are not condemned). So
apparently the validity of THEOREM 4 is denied, so also that of Bacchus L.p.
Though the reason for the flaw is obvious – inference rules are global in nature and
conditional probabilities cover local properties of a universe, hence are more suitable
to be transferred to another universe – but the solution is not as easy.
4 A Solution
To overcome the problems mentioned above it is necessary to find a logical construct
corresponding to conditional probability. It is easily seen that enforcing the interpre-
tation of probability of ordinary implication as conditional probability would lead
to serious problems for then: [β | α]x = [α→ β]x = [¬β → ¬α]x = [¬α | ¬β]x ,
which may easily lead to a contradiction.
So we see that two-valued logics are not sufficient for our purposes. Hence let us
introduce the logical construct |⊢ having the following three-valued semantics: (T
- =true, F=false, U=uninteresting)
p |⊢ q
❅ p T U F
q
T T U U
U U U U
F F U U
We need also truth tables for basic logical constructs ∧, ∨, ¬ :
p ∧ q
❅ p T U F
q
T T U F
U U U F
F F F F
p ∨ q
❅ p T U F
q
T T T T
U T U U
F T U F
❅ ¬q
q
T
U
F
F
U
T
Let us define two probability quantifiers: P1x.α and P2x.α in such a way that P1
expresses the proportion of the expression α taking value T to cases it takes value T
or F. P1x.χ |⊢ β is then equivalent to conditional probability [β | χ]x . P2 expresses
the proportion of cases where a takes values either T or F to cases it takes any of
the values T,F,U. We have then the following properties of both:
1) ∀x1 . . .∀xn. α→ P1x.α = 1 ∧ P2x.α = 1
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2) P1x.α ≥ 0, P2x.α ≥ 0, P2x.α ≥ 1
3) P1x.α + P1x.¬α = 1, P2x.α = P2x.¬α
4) P1x.α + P1x.β ≥ P1x.α ∨ β
5) P1x.α ∧ β = 0→ P1x.α + P1x.β = P1x.α ∨ β
The quantifier P1 captures local properties of the universe while P2 carries global
ones. It is then easily seen that using f instead of implications and P1 instead of []x
in previous examples would resolve all the problems encountered there. Beside this,
the statement “Almost always whenever p implies q then also v implies z” may be
properly expressed by P1x.(p |⊢ q) |⊢ (v |⊢ z) > 0.9. So, by proper axiomatization
we will gain the following: if a proof is to be transferred from one universe to another
one locally similar then all the steps engaging P1 will be kept and those involving P2
need to be verified – also with respect to Miller’s Principle. A detailed presentation
of the axiomatization is given in9.
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